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Abstract
This article explores how our attachment to nature is formed in 
our early love relationships and draws on ideas from psychody-
namic theory and contemporary research in developmental psy-
chology to explore the development of the self, the importance of 
attachment, how “splits” have formed between self and nature as 
a protection against vulnerability, and potential ways forward in 
dealing with this. The article argues that at the heart of our cur-
rent ecological crisis are fundamental problems of dependency and 
vulnerability, resulting for many in an ambivalent attachment to 
nature. Understanding the complex ways in which humans react to 
intimacy as a result of early attachment is central to the project of 
ecopsychology and the ways in which people can help understand 
and shift the nature of their relationships, both to the planet and 
with each other. The article concludes by looking at evidence for a 
securely attached “ecological self” and the potential for develop-
mental models to promote this.
Links Between Person and Planet
M
y aim in writing this article is to propose that our 
love for nature and concern for the planet is intrin-
sically tied up with our early love relationships. Our 
current societal ambivalence toward nature is being 
sorely challenged; to acknowledge our dependency on nature is 
central in solving aspects of the environmental crisis in which we 
fi nd ourselves. From the perspective of psychodynamic theory, I 
will explore how the “self” is formed in early attachment to care-
givers and how good attachment is central to emotional health 
and well-being. I will then explore how by incorporating nature 
into a broader system of attachment relationships it can play a 
central role in helping us to regulate our emotional worlds. I will 
explore the problem of the “split” between nature and psyche and 
consider why such splits form in relation to vulnerability and 
poor early experience. Finally I will suggest how we can heal 
some of these splits and foster stronger attachments to nature.
In using psychodynamic ideas to illustrate the points I am 
making, I will go straight to the issue of anthropocentrism in 
my argument. A critique of my argument is that it is funda-
mentally anthropocentric, seeing human relatedness as the cen-
tral concern in relation to our environmental crisis. There is a 
danger in linking psychodynamic thought with ecopsychology; 
all relationships, including those with nature, can be reduced 
to parental imagos. I would argue there has to be a movement 
between the intrapsychic understanding of the development of 
self and then how this self goes about forming object relation-
ships, particularly with the environment. It is not nature itself 
that needs therapy, rather the humans who inhabit it. There is 
a growing body of evidence and argument that natural envi-
ronments do much better without human interference (Mabey, 
2008; McKibben, 1990; Terborgh, 1999). The issue of human 
dependency and how this becomes enacted in our relationship to 
nature needs to be addressed. We need to understand how com-
plicated patterns of dependency and intimacy are constructed by 
humans in relation to one another and how, subsequently, these 
become manifest in our relationship to nature.
As far back as 1960, Harold Searles proposed that, although 
essential psychodynamic concepts were contained within Freud’s 
writings, Freud failed, as have others since, to explicitly acknowl-
edge the signifi cance of the nonhuman environment in the devel-
opment of human psychological life (Searles, 1960). Later writers 
in ecopsychology have further attempted to elaborate Freud’s con-
cepts. Roszak (1995) posited that the core of the mind is the eco-
logical unconscious, where repression of the cosmic consciousness 
of man’s evolutionary relationship to nature is repressed in an act 
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giver (Gerhardt, 2004; Schore, 2001, 2003; Stern, 1985). Schore 
(2001) focused on infant attachment and the primary caregiv-
er’s psychobiological regulation of the infant’s limbic system as it 
matures and how this is closely related to the infant’s autonomic 
nervous system in the form of an ability to cope with stress, pro-
posing that the attachment relationship is central to helping the 
infant cope with stress. The ability to regulate our emotional 
world and maintain good mental health from this perspective is 
intrinsically linked to attachment in early infancy. The capacity 
to experience union with another and, therefore, a felt sense of 
attachment to nature (Fisher, 2002), results from early positive 
experience of the self-being with another (Stern, 1985). Without 
this fundamental, positive, early experience and the development 
of the capacity to relate, meaningful attachments are diffi cult to 
form.
The Importance of Attachment in the
Development of Self
Attachment theory places the role of mother (or caregiver) as 
central to the infant’s developing sense of sense and emotional 
stability (Bowlby, 1969, 1988; Main, 2000; Stern, 1985). Bowlby’s 
original research into attachment has achieved worldwide rec-
ognition (Bowlby, 1969); he proposed that we develop internal 
working models of attachment, ranging from secure to insecure, 
the subsets of which are avoidant, ambivalent, and disorganized. 
Ainsworth developed these ideas further subjecting them to 
experimental research, developing the strange-situation experi-
ment. The experiment looked at how an infant dealt with separa-
tion from their caregiver while in the presence of a stranger and 
how attachment behavior—secure, insecure, and avoidant—could 
be seen in the infant’s responses (Ainsworth, 1978).
If we see attachment as manifest in patterns of behavior then 
we can explore how aspects of internal working models can be 
applied to relationships with nature. I will outline aspects of inter-
nal working models as defi ned by Main (2000). Securely attached 
individuals fi nd it relatively easy to get close to others and are 
comfortable depending on people and having an interdependent 
relationship: They don’t often worry about being abandoned or 
about someone getting too close to them. Those with avoidant 
attachment patterns are somewhat uncomfortable being close to 
others: They fi nd it diffi cult to trust others completely and have 
diffi culty to allow themselves to be dependent. The third style is 
anxious/ambivalent; those who fi nd that others are reluctant to 
get as close as they would like, and they often worry that their 
partner doesn’t really love them or want to stay with them.
of collusive madness that results in the industrialized society. As 
the original goal of psychotherapy was to awaken the unconscious, 
for Roszak the therapeutic goal of ecopsychology is to awaken the 
inherent sense of environmental reciprocity that lies within the eco-
logical unconscious, healing the alienation of person and planet.
Though I agree with Roszak’s project for ecopsychology, I pro-
pose we have to understand the human-to-human dimensions 
of our crisis because they are intrinsically linked to the plan-
etary crisis. The issue of interdependence is at the heart of the 
growing awareness of the current planetary crisis: We need to 
understand the human complexities of dependency and intimacy 
to understand the diffi culties in our relationship to the environ-
ment. I intend to start with some very human concerns and make 
attempts to link these into problems of attachment to the more-
than-human world (Abram, 1996).
Development of Self in Contemporary 
Psychology
My starting point is recent trends in developmental psychol-
ogy that have been informing psychotherapy practice. The devel-
opmental process for human beings follows three main aspects 
that the human infant needs to negotiate: (1) encountering and 
realizing that it has a “self,” (2) the growing realization that this 
self exists in relation to others, and (3) realizing that this concept 
of self and others can then be expanded to include a relationship 
with the wider world. In forming and developing a self the infant 
must negotiate issues of dependence and independence. Winnicott 
(1986) proposed that the baby moves from absolute dependence to 
relative independence to independence, via the facilitating envi-
ronment with the caregiver. The early experience for the infant 
is a state of subjective oneness with the world and an undiffer-
entiated sense of self. This movement between dependence and 
independence, toward a mature state of dependence is described 
by Searles (1960) both in relation to the mother and what Searles 
terms the nonhuman environment:
The human being is engaged, throughout his lifespan, in an 
unceasing struggle to differentiate himself increasingly fully, 
not only from his human, but also from his nonhuman envi-
ronment, while developing, in proportion as he succeeds in 
these differentiations, an increasingly meaningful relatedness 
with the latter environment as well as with his fellow human 
beings. (p. 30)
There has been a convincing argument based on sound research 
that babies grow their own minds in relation to the primary care-
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as both a maternal and paternal presence in our lives, a recent 
example can illustrate just how aspects of our well-being become 
intrinsically linked to natural environments. It is a quote from 
Roger Deakin (2008), the British naturalist, on the death of his 
father:
The day a policeman came to the door and told me my father 
had died might actually have been the moment that made me 
into a conservationist. I had lost such a big part of my life that 
I needed to compensate by holding on tightly to everything 
else. This may be the source of my passion for conservation. 
(p. 47)
From this perspective, nature can be seen as representing a 
secure base, an aspect of both our internal and external relational 
world that can provide great comfort.
Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, and Target (2002) presented us with 
the idea of affect regulation, a process whereby the individual is 
able to maintain a regulatory position in relation to his or her own 
mood states, maximizing positive and minimizing negative mood 
states. This capacity is intrinsically linked to good attachments 
formed in early infancy that help the infant to regulate its own 
emotional mood states. I think there is strong evidence, especially 
from research in environmental psychology, that argues that peo-
ple use natural environments to help them shift negative mood 
states and maintain positive ones. Research has explored the 
effects of nature on human perception, emotions, behavior, and 
cognition. Urlich (1984) and Verderber and Reuman (1987) found 
that the quality and content of the view from a hospital window 
had a signifi cant affect on a patient’s recovery: The nature con-
tent fostered a quicker recovery postsurgery. Kaplan and Kaplan 
(1989) found that, given the diversity of human preference and 
perception, there were strong and pervasive consistencies in the 
way that we perceive and show preference for particular envi-
ronments. In particular, they found a preference for wilder envi-
ronments untouched by the hand of man and also they found 
a preference for trees and plants. Recent studies have sought to 
identify the importance of woodland and natural landscapes for 
mental health (O’Brien, 2005). Other studies place contact with 
nature as central to our ability to maintain and restore positive 
psychological mood states (Kaplan, 1995; Shibata & Suzuki, 2001, 
2004; Van den Berg, Hartig, & Staats, 2007).
In speaking of attachment we are talking of love. How can 
we love well? How can we speak of our loves? In some senses in 
taking the risk to love and become attached we are also acknowl-
edging the inevitability of some form of loss. Nicholson (2003) 
In some sense the dominant attachment pattern that indus-
trialized societies have to nature is one of avoidance and ambiv-
alence. Searles (1960) made a similar point, seeing relatedness 
to the nonhuman environment as one of the transcendentally 
important facts of human living, and the ambivalence we feel 
towards it, in the way we ignore its importance to us, as the source 
of problems in psychological wellbeing (p. 6).
Shepard (1995) in his treatise “Nature and Madness” argued 
that most of us fail to become as mature as we could be and that 
we act on primitive fears and fantasies located in our unconscious 
world that drives our relationships both with each other and to the 
planet. In terms of development, Shepard argues that the shape of 
all otherness grows out of the maternal relationship. However, sim-
ilar to Searles, he proposes that this relationship is formed within 
the backdrop of the environment that exists for both infant and 
mother. In the evolution of humankind this setting took the form 
of living plants, wild birds, rain, wind, mud and the taste and tex-
ture of earth, and bark, the sounds of animals and insects. These 
surroundings were swallowed, internalized, incorporated as the 
self (p. 27). In terms of modern society, development for Shepard 
takes the form of an “ontogenetic” crippling, adolescent narcis-
sism, oedipal fears, ambivalence, and inconsistency, all of which 
are projected out onto the environment. This historical march 
away from nature results in these private nightmares manifesting 
in broken climates and technologies that pursue an infantile sense 
of mastery, the upshot of which is ever-worsening problems.
These ideas are central to psychoanalysis (and latterly aspects 
of attachment theory), which explains why the idea of depen-
dency on the planet is so threatening to aspects of our sense of 
self. If complicated dependency issues are set up in infancy with 
the primary caregiver, these cannot help but become manifest in 
our relationship to the planet and nature. In this way, an under-
standing of the human problem of need and dependency can help 
us more fully understand why we are in the current environmen-
tal mess and have developed an insecure, avoidant, and ambiva-
lent relationship to nature and the planet.
The Importance of Attachment in 
Emotional Regulation
The current environmental crisis powerfully reminds us of is 
the fact that we are in relationship to the more-than-human world 
and that facets of this relationship are central to our concepts of 
self and the process of emotional regulation.
The idea of secure base is very important in attachment the-
ory (Ainsworth, 1978; Bowlby, 1969). If we posit aspects of nature 
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This allows an organization toward vulnerability to be formed as 
a defence against dependency. We are in a paranoid schizoid place 
in relation to the environment in that we are not in relation to it. 
This is an attempt to preserve some desperately needed sense of 
invulnerability in the face of impeding environmental catastro-
phe that can be experienced as potentially annihilating.
Klein (1940) discussed other mechanisms used to defend 
against the sense of annihilation the infant feels at the hands of 
the bad object. Omnipotence is an attempt by the infant to bring 
things under its control, to exert total power. These defences can 
be seen in our attempts to dominate nature, in the sense of vul-
nerability we feel at times in the face of its indifference to us 
and our dependencies on it, which causes us to attempt to bring 
it under our total control. Herzog (2005) echoed these concepts in 
his fi lm “Grizzly Man” exploring the life and death of Timothy 
Treadwell who lived among the grizzly bears in the Alaskan wil-
derness. Observing the fi lm Treadwell has taken of the bears, 
Herzog states, “I discover no kinship, no understanding, no mercy. 
I see only the overwhelming indifference of nature.” This poses 
the question: How do we defend against this sense of indiffer-
ence to our suffering? One answer is in the form of the relation-
ship to the good object: the defense of narcissim. Kernberg (1975) 
wrote about the narcissistic personality that affects the boundar-
ies between the self and the object world surrounding the self. In 
primary narcissism the infant does not perceive the mother as 
having an existence separate to its own and, therefore, confuses 
dependence with its own sense of omnipotence, need, and grati-
fi cation, all located within the self. Secondary narcissism forms 
as a defence against the disappointments of object love and the 
rage the infant feels against this. The recent book by Krakauer 
(1996) that tells the story of Christopher McCandless, who died in 
the Alaskan wilderness in search of pure relationship to nature, 
is a story of this form of narcissism. McCandless’s quest for a 
reciprocal interdependence with nature, while central to the pro-
ject of ecopsychology, became distorted by an unacknowledged 
rage at the human world. This rage was directed in particular at 
his parents, whom he abandoned, seeking alternative and pure 
relationship with nature: the perfect object relation. This in some 
senses was an attempt to compensate for the disappointment he 
felt with both society and the fallibility of human love, the disap-
pointments of dependency and intimacy. This form of narcissism 
in relationship to nature should sound as a caution to us all, for 
it suggests that nature is perfect and can be the benevolent par-
ent, but doesn’t acknowledge the harshness and inhospitability of 
parts of wilderness landscapes.
says that in speaking of our love we bring our issues of depen-
dency and vulnerability to the fore, as what is loved can be lost 
or harmed or can even betray us. Who has not had to turn away 
from the television or newspaper when some new image of the 
destruction of the natural world reminds us of how what we value 
can be taken away? We have to wrestle with our own feelings of 
powerlessness and helplessness.
The “Split” With Nature: Causes and Affects
The idea of a split between the human psyche and the cause 
of this split has been attributed by many writers to industrial-
ization and the systems of thought needed to sustain and sup-
port such a disconnection (Davis, 1998; Du Nann Winter, 1997; 
Kidner, 2001; Roszak, 1992). Drawing on psychodynamic theory, 
I want to explore the underlying emotional reasons how this split 
formed and why it continues to sustain itself. I see the split linked 
to defences against our own sense of vulnerability in relation to 
dependency on each other and ultimately on nature.
Melanie Klein formulated her theory of the mechanism of split-
ting based on her work with children and adult clients in psycho-
analysis (1957/1988). She saw the infant as driven by primitive 
anxieties that were central to its survival in what the infant expe-
rienced as a threatening world. She theorized that the infant’s life 
was experienced in terms of “objects.” The mother’s breast was 
seen as the primary object, both actual and metaphorical, in the 
infant’s world. She postulated that the infant experiences love 
toward the “good” object in the form of the feeding, comforting, 
and gratifying breast, and hate toward the “bad” object, the un-
gratifying, non-nurturing, unavailable breast. To tolerate the anx-
ieties generated by the bad breast, the infant separates the good 
and bad breasts, even though they belong to the same person—the 
mother. Klein termed this the paranoid schizoid position (Klein, 
1946), whereby the baby is attempting to deal with overwhelming 
feelings of love and hate. To move beyond the paranoid schizoid 
position the baby has to reassemble the mother and in so doing 
must come to terms with the ambivalent feelings it has toward 
both good and bad being located in the same person. By moving 
through this process the infant arrives at the “depressive position”: 
a place where good and bad can be held together. The vulnerability 
in relation to dependency is the driving force for splitting.
If we use Klein’s ideas to understand our relationship to nature, 
it seems we are stuck in a schizoid place in relation to the envi-
ronmental crisis. Refusing to engage with potential environmen-
tal catastrophe that we face is a form of schizoid defence against 
vulnerability and dependency that we feel in relation to nature. 
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with the insights of deep ecology. Though I support this notion, I 
think we need to be careful and avoid a naïve positioning of nature 
in our object relational world. Though some might disagree with 
Klein’s bleak view of the “depressive position,” where good and bad 
can coexist, I would argue aspects of this are central to a balanced 
view of nature’s potential to both heal and destroy, as evidenced 
by recent natural disasters such as the 2004 Asian tsunami.
The split with nature is at the heart of our environmental cri-
sis. It cannot solely be laid at the heart of industrialization, for 
our emotional development has played a key role. For a mature 
dependency to develop, we have to acknowledge our ambiva-
lence, perhaps not to get rid of it, but instead to live with it, and 
not acting out our defences in omnipotent or narcissistic ways. 
Winnicott (1963) considered the true self to be derived from the 
aliveness and vitality of body tissues and their functioning; thus, 
for Winnicott, being is not merely existing but rather feeling real, 
authentic, and alive. This echoes how I see the project of ecopsy-
chology: coming into relationship with nature in ways that cel-
ebrate the complexities of our emotional worlds, acknowledging 
not only the destructive tendencies of the human race, but also 
its capacity for love and reparation, and directing this capacity 
toward the natural world.
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